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RESTRUCTURING THE CORPORATE BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS: FOND HOPE-FAINT 
PROMISE? 
Lewis .D. Solomon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the scope and wealth of America's large corporations has 
grown, federal and state governments have attempted to control cor-
porate power through increasingly complex and comprehensive reg-
ulation. But regulation has often proved clumsy and ineffective, 
and reformers have also examined the distribution of power within 
the corporation itself in search of ways of ensuring that corporate 
power is responsibly wielded. As the landmark work of Berle and 
Means1 showed, management, not shareholders, controls the modem 
large corporation: the dispersal of share ownership has allowed man-
agement to exploit its control of information about the corporation 
and of the corporation's operations, including the proxy mechanism, 
to elect themselves or sympathetic outsiders to the board of directors. 
Naturally reluctant to share its authority, management has mini-
mized the board's participation in corporate govemance,2 and the 
board of directors has been reduced io an "impotent ceremonial and 
legal fiction."3 
Some, including the present Chairman of the SEC, 4 seek to re-
store the corporate board's capacity to oversee and restrain manage-
ment. They hope to recreate the independent board of directors-a 
board with the resources and will for critical judgments, a board 
uninhibited by deference to management and prepared to supervise 
it actively and assertively. This impulse has been expressed in the 
willingness of courts and the SEC to hold directors liable for corpo-
• Professor of Law, George Washington University National Law Center. B.A. 1963, 
Cornell University; J.D. 1966, Yale University. 
I. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 84-
90 (1932). 
2. J. BACON & J. BROWN, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD 6, 10, 12 (1973); M. MACE, infra note 9, at 94-95. 
3. Drucker, The Bored Board, I WHARTON MAGAZINE 19 {1976). 
4. See, e.g., Address by Harold M. Williams, Fifth Annual Securities Regulation Institute 
(Jan. 18, 1978). 
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rate wrongdoing5 and in the pursuit by the SEC and private parties 
of court orders reconstituting boards of directors or redefining their 
authority and responsibilities.6 Some corporate boards have re-
formed themselves; a substantial proportion of the country's large 
corporations have now adopted at least the outward forms of an in-
dependent board.7 
Nevertheless, the integrity of corporate management and of its 
supervising boards of directors has been again brought under public 
scrutiny by the discovery of misuses of funds in a number of large 
and powerful organizations. illegal or improper payments at home 
and abroad have evoked new demands for more effective control of 
corporate managers. 8 
5. See, e.g., the seminal case, Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (outside directors subject to due diligence standard under§ 11 of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976)); and Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 
761 (3d Cir. 1976) (outside director subject to negligence standard under§ 14(a) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976)). 
6. The legal basis for judicially supervised appointment of directors is examined in Far-
rand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1776 (1976); 
Levine & Herlihy, SEC Enforcement Actions, IO REv. SEC. REG. 951 (March 30, 1977); Ma-
thews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive Actions, 31 
Bus. LAW. 1323 (1976); Comment, Court Appointed Directors: Ancillary Relief in Federal Secur-
ities Law Enforcement Actions, 64 GEO. L.J. 737 (1976); Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC 
Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1188 (1975). For cases involving appointment of 
directors by or under direction of the court, see SEC v. Charter Diversified Serv., Civ. Action 
No. CV 74-2527 (C.D. Cal., filed Aug. 29, 1974), discussed in SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 
6507, 6593 (Sept. 9 & Nov. 18, 1974) (additional interim directors would constitute a majority 
of the board); SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., (D. Kan.), discussed in SEC Litigation Releases Nos. 
5715, 5798 (Jan. 30 & March 20, 1973) (court designated five new directors, a new president 
and chief executive officer; settlement also provided that all but two of the present members of 
the board of directors would resign); SEC v. American Agronomics, Civ. Action No. 72-331 
(N.D. Ohio, filed April 6, 1972), discussed in SEC Litigation Release No. 5667 (Dec. 11, 1972) 
(board restructured to include at least a 40% independent representation); SEC v. Bio-Medical 
Sciences, Inc., Civ. Action No. 226 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan 16, 1975), discussed in SEC Litigation 
Release No. 6700 (Jan. 28, 1975) (corporation shall use its best efforts to elect or appoint to, 
and maintain on its board of directors, a majority of directors independent of association or 
involvement in the activity alleged in the SEC's complaint); SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 
(S.D. Tex.), discussed in SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973) (court to designate 
six new independent members satisfactory to the SEC and elected by the corporation's board); 
SEC v. Vesco, unreported judgment discussed in International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 
F.2d 1334, 1338-40 (2d Cir. 1974) (International Controls Corp. consented to final judgment 
providing for replacement of the board of directors by a court-appointed interim board of 
directors); SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., (1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
93,917 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (court appointed an interim independent board of directors to replace 
the existing board of directors). 
1. See text at notes 33-38 infra. 
8. See SECURITIES & EXCHANGE CoMMN., REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL 
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 41-42 (1976) (submitted to the Senate Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs Comm.); Solomon & Linville, Transnational Conduct of American Mul-
tinational Corporations: Questionable Payments Abroad, 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 303 
(1976). 
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Reforms, then, have been instituted, and an extensive literature 
on corporate reform has developed. It is time that we seriously ex-
amine the reforms and the literature to assess the accomplishments 
and possibilities of the corporate board of directors. This Article is 
a first step in that direction. 
The Article begins by investigating the reasons for the impotence 
of corporate boards. It then examines two models of reformed 
boards and finds both models badly flawed. The Article proceeds to 
case studies of three corporations-Mattel, Inc., Northrop Corp., 
and Lockheed Corp.-which under court· order have attempted to 
reform their boards by increasing the proportion of outside directors 
and by establishing more board committees. The case studies sug-
gest that the problem of corporate reform is too complex and intrac-
table to respond to so simple a solution as the reform of corporate 
boards. Our efforts to revive the board of directors are simply 
anachronistic; new methods must be devised if we are to make cor-
porate management genuinely accountable. 
II. BACKGROUND TO REFORM 
A. The .Decline of the Board of .Directors 
Myles Mace's empirical studies in the late 1960s confirmed what 
many had long suspected: directors generally play a minor role in 
corporate affairs.9 Mace concluded that boards perform two essen-
tially passive functions. First, they give advice when asked to do so 
by the chief executive officer. Second, boards fortify management's 
self-discipline-executives who must periodically account to the 
board for their stewardship have an incentive to think carefully 
about that accounting and to anticipate the questions it raises. 10 
Boards do occasionally assert themselves. They have assumed man-
agerial responsibilities when management has collapsed, and they 
have replaced a chief executive officer upon his death or incapacita-
tion. But such activisim is rare. As Mace has noted, in the cases in 
which a board fired a chief executive officer, "The leadership Qf the 
[incumbent] was so unsatisfactory that even his mother thought he 
ought [to go] for the good of the company-and it usually had to be 
that bad before the board reluctantly moved."11 
9. See generally M. MA.CE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971) (study of corporate 
boards of directors in the late 1960s based on approximately 75 in-depth interviews lasting two 
to six hours and on several hundred shorter discussions with executives). 
10. Id. at 13-27. See also J. LoUDEN, THE EFFECTIVE DIRECTOR IN ACTION 60 (1975). 
11. Hearings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 30, 1977) (statement 
by Myles L. Mace). Probably the most celebrated corporate ouster was the removal of Bob R. 
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Management often installs on the board people who are econom-
ically and psychologically sympathetic, if not indebted, to the chief 
executive officer and who are therefore disinclined to challenge him. 
Inside directors-subordinate executives of the corporation-depend 
on the chief executive not only for their tenure on the board, but for 
their promotions and salaries.12 Outside directors-directors not 
concurrently employees of the corporation-also depend on the chief 
executive for their position on the board, and they frequently have 
personal and business reasons for agreeing with him. Outside direc-
tors are often friends and social acquaintances of the chief executive 
or from the upper echelons of companies and professional firms pa-
tronized by or otherwise economically concerned with the corpora-
tion. These social and professional connections may overlap; 
regionally and nationally, the elites13 who do business together also 
Dorsey and three other top executives after a report of the Special Review Committee of Gulf 
Oil Corp. on the corporation's secret slush fund in January 1976. See Calame, Cleaning Up the 
Slush, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1976, at 40, col. l; Calame, Morality Play, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1976, 
at I, col. 6; Jensen, Gulf Oil's Directors Debating Response lo Scandal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 
1976, at 45, col. 3; Jensen, Gulf Resolved Split on Ouster, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1976, at 47, col. 
I; Robertson, The Directors Woke Up Too Late al Gulf, FORTUNE, June 1976, at 121. Re-
moval of executives at the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. and Singer Co. is detailed in 
FORBES, May 15, 1976, at 99-103. 
12. Although inside directors are economically tied to and sympathetic with management, 
inside directors can perform useful service on corporate boards by providing information to 
outside directors, facilitating an appraisal of management by outside directors, preventing a 
chief executive officer from painting an unrealistically favorable picture of a corporation's 
performance, and making decisions of the board of directors more palatable to other execu-
tives. See J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 2, at 64-65; Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 140 (1976) (statement 
by Richard M. Cyert). But insiders generally find it difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate or 
question a chief executive officer. 
13. G. William Domhoff has described a ruling elite composed of the owners and manag-
ers of large corporations and banks. They receive a disproportionate amount of income, own 
a disproportionate share of America's wealth and contribute a disproportionate number of the 
members of key institutions and decision-making groups. G. DOMHOFF, THE BOHEMIAN 
GROVE AND OTHER RETREATS: A STUDY IN RULING CLASS COHESIVENESS (1974); G, 
DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES: THE GOVERNING CLASS IN AMERICA (1970). Domhofrs 
empirical work assesses the institutional framework of social clubs and organizations which 
formulate policy, investigates the social backgrounds of individuals who control important 
institutions and make major decisions, and draws inferences from wealth and income statistics. 
Boards of directors are staffed from this elite and its satellites, including current or former 
chief executive officers, professionals who (with some exceptions) have corporate clients, and 
professors of business and law. Despite varied backgrounds, these individuals share and sup-
port the interests and viewpoints of those who manage complex hierarchical organizations; 
they are sympathetic to the pressures and uncertainties that confront chief executive officers. 
''Independent" outside directors who lead their own organizations and face their own boards 
especially are not anxious to create activist precedents for their boards. Although the elite 
may not come from a single readily identifiable stratum of society, its members generally are 
governed by the club's protocol, which restrains a director from trespassing on management's 
turf. 
Critics of Domhoff and other ruling class theorists argue that power must be analyzed issue 
by issue. These critics doubt that a common class ideology exists and that Domhoff ade-
quately defines the nature of the class's interests, or the issues on which the class unites. They 
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work for the same community and charitable organizations, belong 
to the same social clubs, and even relax at the same camps.14 In the 
congenial atmosphere of board meetings these companionships may 
lead board members to be sympathetic listeners rather than deter-
mined inquisitors. Is 
Even if directors were personally independent, the position and 
method of corporate boards would limit their supervision of man-
agement. First, few outside directors devote to their directorial duties 
the substantial time needed to review comprehensively manage-
ment's performance. 16 Directors often serve on several boards, their 
own organizations call on their time, and the relatively modest com-
pensation they receive is slight motivation. 
Second, directors lack independent access to information: man-
agement controls the volume, quality, and timing of the information 
they receive.I7 Typically, directors are given selected materials 
shortly before or at a board meeting, and have too little time to study 
it. The experience described by one director is common: 
[A] voluminous report (100+ pages in length) on an investigation of a 
sensitive matter was presented at the meeting itself, after which law-
yers, accountants and top management all were marched through, 
carefully orchestrated, to support management's desired position on 
the matter. The committee's acquiescence, of course, permitted per-
functory approval of the action the next day by the entire board. I8 
dispute Domhoff's description of the composition, size and wealth ofDomhoffs ruling elite as 
well as his conclusion that power is monopolized by the wealthy and by corporate managers. 
The composition of the old board of directors of Northrop Corp., one of the companies 
discussed below, see text at notes 50-59, illustrates the clubbiness of some corporate boards. 
At least four members,, including the chairman, belonged to one or both of two of California's 
most exclusive social clubs. G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES, supra, at 176-77, 196-97, 
212-13. 
14. Id. at 176-77; M. MACE, supra note 9, at 45, 89. 
15. McAlmon, The Corporate Boardroom: A Closed Circie, Bus. & SoCY. REv., Winter 
1974-1975, at 65. 
16. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 143 
(1976). 
17. The ignorance of the board of directors of the Penn Central is perhaps an extreme 
example, but it suggests management's unwillingness to keep the directors informed about 
even massive problems, as well as the board's lack of interest in the affairs of the corporation. 
According to an SEC staff study, 
Pennsylvania Railroad and New York Central directors were accustomed to a generally 
inactive role in company affairs. They never changed their view of their rofe. Both 
before and after the merger [on February 1, 1968) they relied on oral descriptions of com-
pany affairs. They failed to perceive tlie complexities of the merger or the fact that ap-
propriate groundwork and planning had not been done. After the merger they claim to 
have been unaware of the magnitude of the fundamental operational problems or the 
critical financial situation until near the end. [The Penn Central Co. went into bank-
ruptcy on June 21, 1970.) They did not receive or request written budgets or cash flow 
information which were essential to understandin~ the condition of the company or the 
~rformance of management Only in late 1969 did they begin requesting such informa-
tion and even then it was not made available in a form that was meaningful or useful. 
SEC Staff Study of the Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Co.-Summary, [1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 78,931, at 82,012 (August 3, 1972). 
18. Letter from Donald E. Farrar to Lewis D. Solomon (Oct. 11, 1977). 
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Third, not all directors are technically or psychologically 
equipped to oversee the affairs of a large corporation. Some direc-
tors lack the ability or background to analyze technical, financial, 
and business issues. Many directors, especially those who are cor-
porate executives themselves, are accustomed to exercising power, 
not counselling it. Boards therefore progressively relinquished their 
complex and arcane managerial duties to the more expert officers 
and devoted themselves to trivia and the perquisites of their exalted 
status. 
In sum, corporate boards form a closed club of elites sharing sim-
ilar experiences and views. Directors are disinclined to criticize and 
lack the resources to do so. Board meetings are predict-
able-directors are expected to ratify management's decisions with a 
minimum of delay and unpleasantness. Inquisitiveness is inter-
preted as distrust of the chief executive and as a violation of good 
corporate manners. 19 Chief executive officers do not want to be chal-
lenged, especially if subordinate officers are present, for fear of los-
ing the respect of their subordinates.20 As one experienced director 
noted, "[This] system breeds insularity, a tendency to make comfort-
able decisions, and it avoids confronting significant change in the 
surrounding world. It is an atmosphere in which directors reinforce, 
rather than challenge, each other's opinions and ideas. In short, 
there is too much potential for laxity."21 
B. Proposals for Reforming the Board of .Directors 
Directors have met mounting disapproval of their complacent re-
lations with management, and they have increasingly found them-
selves vulnerable to legal action for mismanagement that occurred 
under their aegis. The SEC has criticized directors for their part in 
several recent cases of mismanagement. 22 On the occasion of the 
Stirling Homex affair, the SEC admonished directors to take greater 
19. M. MAcE, supra note 9, at 52-54, 79-81. See also Vanderwicken, Change Invades lhe 
Board Room, FORTUNE, May 1972, at 156, 158. 
20. J. LOUDEN, THE EFFECTIVE DIRECTOR IN ACTION 54-55 (1975). 
21. The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World· Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Citizens and Shareholder Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on lhe Judiciary, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, at 125 (1977). 
22. See SEC Slaff Study of the Financial Collapse of the Penn. Central Co.-Summa,y, 
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 78,931 (August 3, 1972); Report of the 
Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corp. Relating to Activities of the Board of 
Directors of Stirling Homex Corp., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 
80,219, at 85,462-63 (Aug. 16, 1975). 
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initiative in ferreting out information and challenging management 
rather than relying on management's representation. The Commis-
sion emphasized the self-evident propositions that outside directors 
violate their duty to protect shareholders and others if they fail to 
guide the corporation. 23 
The heightened public expectations of corporate behavior and 
the interest of the SEC and the courts in corporate governance have 
stimulated a reexamination of the role of the board and of the indi-
vidual director.24 Efforts to redefine those roles are a prerequisite of 
proposals for more effective corporate governance. Without such a 
redefinition, it is impossible to assess the efficacy of reforms in the 
composition and operation of the corporate board. Perhaps more im-
portant, a consideration of the general purpose of the board can shed 
light on the ultimate question whether the board of directors, how-
ever reformed, is a viable instrument of corporation control. 
The debate regarding the role and function of the board of direc-
tors in corporate affairs has focused on (1) the board as monitor and 
advisor of management, and (2) the board as an adversary of man-
agement. The first model encompasses a broad range of possibilities. 
At one end of the scale, a board would confine itself to measuring 
management's performance against fixed goals and discharging 
managers who failed to meet them. 25 At the other extreme, a board 
would decide whether to accept management proposals regarding 
major policies and objectives of the corporation.26 In the middle of 
the spectrum, boards would vary the comprehensiveness of their re-
view and of their participation in decisions. 27 A board could expand 
its evaluations, for example, by periodically examining the corpora-
23. Report of the Investigation in the Matter of Stirling Homex Corp. Relating to Activi-
ties of the Board of Directors of Stirling Homex Corp., (1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. 
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 80,219, at 85,463 (Aug. 16, 1975). 
24. For a summary of the SEC's present areas of investigation, see The Role of the Share-
holder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholder 
Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, at 608 
(1977) (testimony of Philip Loomis, SEC Commissioner); see generally Conti, Boardroom 
Blues, Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 6. 
25. For an analysis of such monitoring, see M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 164-65; Cor-
porate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 62-63 (1976) (statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr.); id. at 304 (statement of then-
SEC Chairman Roderick Hills); Levy, The Search far Greater Board Effectiveness-II, in CON-
FERENCE BOARD, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 6-7 (1972). Professor Eisenberg sees no feasible 
alternative to the board as the monitoring body. The shareholders lack the cohesiveness and 
resources necessary to monitor management; a council of executives from a corporation would 
inevitably be subordinate to the chief executives; and a government agency would politicize 
the selection and removal of executives. M. EISENBERG, supra note 16, at 167-68. 
26. See, e.g., INVESTOR R.EsPONSIBILITY R.EsEARCH CENTER, INC., CHANGES IN THE COR· 
PORATE BOARD ROOM: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? WHO SHOULD Do IT? 14-15 (1974). 
27. The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
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tion's organization and decision-making process. Conversely, a 
board could limit its involvement to the most general decisions, leav-
ing more specific decisions to management, subject to the board's 
monitoring. However a board defines its function, it should force 
management to ponder its proposals and to confront issues it might 
otherwise overlook. The model of the board as monitor and advisor 
assumes that a board can promote this ideal by participating in deci-
sions or by telling management that the board will consider these 
issues in assessing performance. 
This first model contemplates a board working with manage-
ment, the second a board acting as an adversary to management. 
For example, such a board might investigate management and report 
to the corporation's shareholders and other constituencies whether 
its officers have complied with legal and social demands on corpo-
rate conduct. 28 
Although these models may, in the abstract, be appealing, in 
practice they are not easily reconciled with the realities of corporate 
life. 
It is hard to imagine how an "advisory" board could participate 
in corporate decisions other than those involving broad statements of 
the most general level of policy. Directors, with limited time to 
devote to the corporation and dependent on executives for access to 
information, probably cannot initiate or significantly shape corpo-
rate policies, even in conjunction with management. 
Even the modest and perhaps more realistic monitoring role 
raises troublesome problems.29 Acceptable, specific, and measurable 
standards of management performance are not easily established.30 
Citizens and Shareholder Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, at 131 (1977) (statement of J. Wilson Newman). 
Management theorist Peter Drucker has suggested the functions of a board which actively 
monitors management: 
Someone must force top management to think through what the co~ration's business is 
and what it should be, what objectives are being set and strategies being develoJ><:d, look 
critically at corporate planning, capital-investment policy, managed-expenditures budget, 
monitor people decisions and organization :eroblems, watch the organization's spirit, see 
to it that the corporation succeeds in utilizing the stren~ths of people and neutralizing 
their weaknesses, develop tomorrow's managers, reward its managers . . . . 
P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 631 (1974). See also 
Drucker, supra note 3, at 22-23; J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 2, at 18 (1975). 
28. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING OF THE GIANT CORPORATION 120 
(1976). 
29. See, e.g., J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 2, at 26; Leech & Mundheim, The Outside 
.Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799, 1805 (1976). 
30. For suggestions on the development of standards and procedures for an audit of man-
agement and on the need to balance "bottom line" results and social responsibility, see J. 
BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 2, at 21; Leech & Mundheim, supra note 29, at 1824-25; 
McSweeney, A Scorecard far Rating Management, Bus. WEEK, June 8, 1974, at 12; Wilde & 
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Even if criteria can be set, the pace of business may render guide-
lines out of date, necessitating frequent revisions. Standards would 
be difficult to administer, and measurements might require informa-
tion not supplied by management. In addition, the directors would 
have to decide whom to hold responsible if standards were not satis-
fied.31 Finally, directors would have to resolve the fundamental 
question: how far should they impose their judgment on manage-
ment? Inevitably, in monitoring, a board would disagree with man-
agement over the meaning of the standards and the scope of the 
review. Thus, monitoring might disrupt the company's operations 
as the board assays management's performance, and might provoke 
directorial infringement of management's prerogatives. Even if ex-
pectations regarding management's prerogatives were to be changed, 
a more active board would still face the problems discussed with ref-
erence to the participatory board. 
An adversary relationship between board and management is in-
imical to the spirit of cooperation it is widely believed the board and 
management must maintain. A watchdog board might stimulate di-
visiveness within the corporation, intimidate management, and in-
hibit its ability to initiate and implement programs. 
In short, effective changes in the function of the corporate board 
cannot be achieved without significantly altering our understanding 
of how a large corporation works. The reforms actually instituted 
have typically settled for modest attempts to enhance the indepen-
dence of the board of directors from management and have post-
poned larger, and harder, questions as to a board's function.32 These 
reforms have consisted of three changes in corporate boards: an in-
crease in the proportion of outside directors; greater use of board 
committees, especially audit committees; and an improvement in the 
flow of information to directors. 
Surveys suggest that many corporations, with or without external 
pressure, have instituted these changes in the last several years. One 
survey of over five hundred manufacturing companies showed a re-
cent increase from 63% to 71 % in the number of companies reporting 
Vancil, Pe,formance Audits by Outside Directors, HARV. Bus. REV., July-August 1972, at 112. 
31. Of course, managers of any complex organization encounter these problems in evalu-
ating subordinates. But those managers rely on time and expertise unavailable to a board of 
directors. 
32. See, e.g., the statement by Roderick Hills, then chairman of the SEC: "[T]he most 
important job we [the SEC] have to do is create a truly independent character on those boards 
of directors, both from a remedial standpoint, when we found the problem, and from a per-
spective standpoint." Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 316-17 (1976). 
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that a majority of their board members were outsiders.33 Other 
surveys have shown that the proportion of manufacturing companies 
with audit committees has increased from about 20% in 1967 to 45% 
in 1973,34 with over 70% of the reporting firms with assets in excess 
of $500 million having an audit committee in 1972.35 According to 
one analyst, 93% of America's largest corporations had audit com-
mittees in 1976, compared to 72% in 1973.36 Corporations have also 
kept directors better informed. In the early 1970s, a survey of 1500 
large companies found that only 77% provided their directors with 
any information prior to board meetings.37 In 1976 a survey of 370 
large companies found that 94% provided reports to directors before 
board meetings.3s 
Unfortunately, these data are ambiguous. For example, 
"outside directors" are sometimes former and retired executives of 
the corporation or members of institutions having a business or pro-
fessional relationship with the corporation, such as law firms, banks, 
suppliers, and customers. Such directors have an economic interest 
in the corporation and for many purposes are insiders. The interests 
of members of law firms and banks are especially likely to coincide 
with the interests of management. Of course, the economic interests 
of these institutions are not uniform. For example, firms that 
purchase from the corporation desire lower prices; firms that sell to 
the corporation are willing to see the corporation raise the prices of 
its products. The point is that such "outside" directors have an in-
centive to work closely and amicably with management and little 
incentive to challenge it. 
33. J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: MEMBERSHIP AND COMMITTEES OF 
THE BOARD 2 (1973). The survey was conducted by The Conference Board and the American 
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc. A 1976 study by The Conference Board revealed that 
outsiders comprised a majority of the board in 83% of the 167 manufacturing companies sur-
veyed. J. BACON & J. BROWN, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES IN 
NINE COUNTRIES 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NINE COUNTRIES]. For nonmanufacturing 
companies, the percentage of companies having boards on which outside directors were in the 
majority remained remarkably stable at 85%, 86%, and 86% in, respectively, 1967, 1973, and 
1976. J. BACON, supra, at 2; NINE COUNTRIES, supra, at 84. 
34. NINE COUNTRIES, supra note 33, at 99. A study by Coopers & Lybrand indicated a 
rise in the percentage of respondents having audit committees from 17% in 1967 to 67% in 
1972. The Coopers & Lybrand Audit Committee Guide 7, Figure 1 (2d ed. 1976). 
35. J. BACON, supra note 33, at 54. 
36. Korn/Ferry International, Board of Directors, Fourth Annual Study 9 (Feb. 1977), 
37. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD: PROFILE OF THE BOARD OF DI-
RECTORS 10 (1977); Vanderwicken, supra note 19, at 159. 
38. Korn/Ferry International, Board of Directors, Fourth Annual Study 18 (Feb. 1977). 
See also R. MAUTZ & F. NEUMANN, CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES: POLICIES AND PRAC-
TICES 84 (1977) (responses with respect to information provided to audit committees). 
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If former employees are considered insiders, the percentage of 
manufacturing companies in the 1976 Conference Board study 
whose boards have a majority of outside directors falls from 83% to 
60%.39 Another tabulation of the composition of boards based on 
the Conference Board tables revealed that 41 % of the "outsiders" 
were former or retired executives, partners of outside legal counsel, 
or executives of commercial or investment banks.40 Similarly, the 
evidence of the proliferation of board committees and of the trans-
mission of more information to board members must be more closely 
scrutinized before one can say that it represents significant enhance-
ment of the independence of boards. The value of information fur-
nished boards is difficult to evaluate-the line between too much and 
•too little is obscure, and most information received by boards is col-
lected and screened by management.41 
In sum, although these devices may have established themselves 
as commonly advocated features of large corporations, they may not 
represent genuine changes in corporate governance. Management 
has simply adopted the language and form of the restructured board 
in response to the pressure for "reform," but few substantive changes 
have been made, as the evidence as to the effectiveness of outside 
directors and board committees in Part III suggests. 
III. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF CORPORATE BOARDS: THREE 
CASE STUDIES 
To measure accurately the value of institutional reform one must 
look beyond broad surveys and impressionistic commentary. To 
this end, I have studied reforms at three large corporations where 
39. NINE COUNTRIES, supra note 33, at 85. 
40. Hearings before the Securities and Exchange Commission 3 (Sept. 30, 1977) (state-
ment by Myles L. Mace). 
41. Some commentators have suggested that directors should have direct access to infor-
mation from within the corporation. See, e.g., C. BROWN & E. SMITH, THE DIRECTOR LOOKS 
AT His JoB 147 (1957); Leech & Mundheim, supra note 29, at 1825; Corporate Rights and 
Responsibilities: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 304, 
329 (1976) (statement of then-SEC chairman Roderick Hills). 
For statements of the kinds and frequency of reports directors should receive from man-
agement, as well as of other means of securing information, such as tours of corporate opera-
tions, see, e.g., Subcomm. on Functions and Responsibilities of Directors, of the Comm. on 
Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Associa-
tion, Corporate .Directors' Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5, 22 (1976); Harris, .Directors of Industrial 
Companies: Special Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1235, 1238 (1976); NINE COUNTRIES, supra note 
33, at 95-99; J. LOUDEN, supra note 10, at 35-36, 89-90 (1975); Berger & Donelson, What 
.Directors Need To Know. • . and How To Get It to Them, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE, September 
1974, at 22-27; Mace, Becoming More Aware and Knowledgeable, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct., 
1975, at 18. However, chief executives are generally reluctant to allow board members direct 
contact with underlings for fear that their authority will be undercut. H. KoON1Z, THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT 161 (1967). 
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managerial malfeasance provoked administrative or private litiga-
tion and considerable public attention. This litigation produced re-
medial orders which included provisions for reform of the boards of 
directors. Part A recounts the events leading up to the litigation and 
relate& the terms of the settlement. Part B examines the implementa-
tion of the orders, and Part C assesses the impact of reform. 
A. An Overview 
The board reforms at Mattel were mandated by a consent decree 
in an action brought in 1974 by the SEC against the company fol-
lowing the discovery that the company had issued false and mislead-
ing fmancial reports.42 Specifically, Mattel, which had suffered 
heavy fmancial reverses as a result of hasty diversification in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, was accused of substantially overstating its 
sales and earnings.43 
The consent decree contained fairly detailed provisions for in-
creasing the proportion of outside directors and for establishing 
board committees. The decree required Mattel to appoint, subject 
to the SEC's approval, enough "unaffiliated" directors to constitute 
a majority of the board.44 The decree also required Mattel to estab-
lish three board committees: (1) an executive committee of three or 
more members, a majority of whom were to be unaffiliated directors 
42. See SEC Litigation Release No. 6531, (Oct. 2, 1974). See also the Mattel news release 
of Oct. 2, 1974, in Mattel, Inc., Annual Report to Shareholders for the year ending Feb. 1, 
1975, and Quarterly Reports through the nine months ending Nov. 1, 1975, at 12-14. 
43. Carberry, Valley of the .Dolls, Wall St. J., June 20,_1973, at 1, col. l; Mattel, Inc., 
Reports of Special Counsel and Special Auditor, Part One-Report of Special Counsel 28, 31-
33 (Nov. 3, 1975). 
44. Part IV, Second Amended Judgment and Order of Permanent Injunction and Ancil-
lary Relief [hereinafter cited as Second Amended Judgment], in SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civ. 
Action No. 74-2958-FW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 1974), defined ''unaffiliated" as follows: 
Said additional directors shall not have had any affiliation with MATTEL or its subsidi-
aries prior to the filing by the COMMISSION of its COMPLAINT in this Action, and 
they sllall not have any such affiliation during their tenure on the Board other than as 
members of the Board and/or committees thereof. 
The SEC sees outsider directors as "private securities commissioners" who supplement the 
limited resources of the Commission. It believes that requiring the appointment of independ-
ent directors is more effective than enjoining future wrongdoing, and That that sanction is not 
so severe as to prevent the company from carrying on its business. Interview with Edward D. 
Herlihy, Branch Chief, Division of Enforcement, SEC, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 8, 1977); In-
terview with Theodore A. Levine, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC (Nov. 9, 
1977). See generally Loo & Ratner, The SEC's Role in .Director Selection, in PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE, DUTIES AND REsPONSIBILITIES OF OUTSIDE DIRECTORS 144-45 (1976); Sporkin, 
SEC .Developments in Litigations and the Moulding of Remedies, 29 Bus. LAW. 121 (1974); 
Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 
1210-14 (1975). 
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appointed pursuant to the decree;45 (2) a financial controls and audit 
committee consisting of four directors, at least three of whom were to 
be unaffiliated directors appointed pursuant to the decree;46 and (3) 
a litigation and claims committee, consisting of three members se-
lected from and designated by the new unaffiliated directors. 47 A 
majority of the additional unaffiliated directors were required to ap-
point, subject to the approval of the SEC and the court, a special 
counsel to investigate and report on the charges against Mattel's of-
ficers. This special counsel was empowered to institute, with board 
approval, legal actions on behalf of Mattel against anyone who had 
been or was associated with the company.48 The basic provisions of 
the decree were to remain in effect for five years from the date of 
entry unless the court decreed otherwise in the "interest of justice."49 
45. Part V, Second Amended Judgment, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civ. Action No. 74-2958-FW 
(C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 1974). See also SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp., (S.D. Tex.), dis-
cussed in SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973) (corporation's board shall elect a 
new three-member executive committee which must include two new directors, one of whom 
shall be chairman; the executive committee ( or the chairman of such committee) shall have the 
right, at the corporation's expense, to retain independent legal counsel to advise them with 
respect to their functions as members of the executive co=ittee). 
46. Part VI, Second Amended Judgment, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civ. Action No. 74-2958-
FW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 1974). This committee was directed by the settlement order to 
review Mattel's financial controls, accounting procedures and financial reports, and to discuss 
periodically with the auditors the company's financial condition and statement. The order 
stipulated that the company could not release financial information to the public or sharehold-
ers or change the independent auditors without prior approval of the co=ittee. Moreover, 
the committee was empowered to arbitrate disputes between management and the auditors. 
For similar orders in other cases, see SEC v. American Agronomics, Inc., Civ. Action No. 226 
(S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 16, 1975), discussed in SEC Litigation Release No. 5667 (Nov. 7, 1972) 
(an accounting committee of the independent directors to be established); SEC v. Lum's Inc., 
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 94,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (as Jong as 
Caesars World, Inc. (formerly Lum's, Inc.,) has securities registered under § 12 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, the corporation is to continue to have a standing audit committee 
consisting of two or more members of the board who are not officers or employees of the 
corporation); SEC v. Coastal States Gas Corp. (S.D. Tex.), discussed•in SEC Litigation Re-
lease No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973) (corporation to appoint a three-member independent audit 
committee with a majority of new independent directors); Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1977, at 8, col. I 
(audit committee to be reconstituted and to have a majority of new directors, one of whom is 
to be the chairman). 
47. Part VII, Second Amended Judgment, SEC v. Mattel, Inc,, Civ. Action No. 74-2958-
FW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 1974). The committee was empowered to review claims against 
past and present officers, directors, employees, arid controlling persons arising out of their 
relationship with Mattel, to determine what actions the company should bring, and to approve 
any settlement of such claims. 
48, Part VIII, Second Amended Judgment, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civ. Action No. 74-2958-
FW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 1974). The special counsel was directed to retain a special 
auditor (subject to the approval of the corporation, the SEC, and the court) to verify the sus-
pect financial statements. Part IX, Second Amended Judgment, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civ. Ac-
tion No. 74-2958-FW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 1974). 
49. Part XV, Second Amended Judgment, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civ. Action No. 74-2958-
FW (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 26, 1974). q. SEC v. Equity Funding Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder) 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 93,917 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (the court-appointed interim board to hold 
office until further order of court on application of SEC and until shareholders of the corpora-
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In contrast to the rather conventional wrongdoing committed at 
Mattel, Northrop fell victim to the post-Watergate sensitivity to 
kinds of corporate improprieties long overlooked by the public and 
by the regulators. Under its flamboyant president, Thomas V. 
Jones, Northrop had become a leading seller of military aircraft in 
the international arms market. In 1974, an investigation by the 
Watergate Special Prosecutor and later by Northrop's independent 
auditors revealed that the corporation had made illegal domestic po-
litical contributions and had given large subventions to "representa-
tives" of the company abroad.so Northrop and its top management 
were sued by a group of shareholders who claimed that the corpora-
tion, Jones, and several other officers had violated federal securities 
and campaign laws and had breached their fiduciary duties under 
state corporation law.st 
The Northrop litigation, like the Mattel litigation, produced a 
settlement restructuring the board of directors. The settlement re-
quired the company to elect four new outside directors as well as to 
amend the certificate of incorporation by adopting a provision which 
increased the size of the board and assured that outsiders would 
comprise a majority of it.s2 Candidates for the new directorships 
tion elect a new board of directors in compliance with the provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934). 
50. The illegal political payments are discussed in Report to the Board of Directors of 
Northrop Corp. on Special Investigation of the Executive Committee 1 (July 16, 1975). North-
rop and Jones pled guilty and were each fined $5,000. Criminal charges were also filed against 
James Allen, former Northrop vice-president and director, who pled guilty to a misdemeanor 
charge and was fined $1,000. Id. at 1. For information about the auditor's investigation, see 
Multinational Corporations and United Stales Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Multinational Corporal ions of the Sen ale Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt, 
12, at 147 (1975) [hereinafter cited as .Multinational Hearings]. The corporation's independent 
auditors, Ernst & Ernst, in tum, engaged another accounting firm, Price Waterhouse & Co., to 
participate in the investigation. Report to the Board of Directors of Northrop Corp, on the 
Special Investigation of the Executive Committee 1 (July 16, 1975). For a description of the 
investigatory procedures used by Ernst & Ernst, see Supplement to the Report on Special 
Investigation of Northrop Corp. and Subsidiaries (as supplied by Ernst & Ernst), in Mu/11-
nalional Hearings, pt. 12, at 925-32. 
For a summary of the special investigation report of the auditors, see Report to the Board 
of Directors of Northrop Corp. on the Special Investigation of the Executive Committee 1 
(July 16, 1975). See also an Ernst & Ernst memorandum of the L.D. Gray interview with T.V. 
Jones, June 25, 1974. A colorful account of Northrop and Jones can be found in A. SAMPSON, 
THE ARMS BAZAAR 141-53 (1977). See also Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearings 
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 440 (1976); Weinstein, Northrop's 
Solo Act, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1975, at 61, col. 6. 
51. Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 1975). The SEC 
also brought an action for the violations of federal law, SEC v. Northrop Corp., No. 75-9563 
(D.D.C., filed April 1976). Both cases were settled on essentially the same terms. 
52. Undertaking Incorporated into Final Judgment, Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-
1455-F (C.D. Cal, filed Jan. 20, 1975). "Independent outside director'' was defined as an 
individual who had not, within a specified period, (1) received in excess of a specified dollar 
figure for services rendered or from the sale of material to the corporation or (2) been associ-
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were to be selected by the existing board subject only to the court's 
determination that the candidates met the settlement's vague com-
mand that they have "experience, independence, integrity and ability 
to make significant contributions as directors of Northrop and to ful-
fill the special responsibilities of New Directors."53 
The settlement also reconstituted the Board's executive, audit, 
and nominating committees. The executive committee was directed 
to report on Northrop's relationships with its emissaries and consul-
tants at home and abroad and to recommend reforms in the com-
pany's organiz?tion which would prevent future wrongdoing. To 
insure that the committee would distance itself from management 
during the inquiry, the settlement provided that for a specified time 
five of the six committee members would be outside directors and 
that three of these, including the chairman, would be new outside 
directors.54 The settlement further provided that the audit and nomi-
nating committees would permanently consist entirely of outside di-
rectors.55 
As at Northrop, illegal payments prompted administrative and 
judicial sanctions against Phillips Petroleum. The company and 
several individual directors were accused of surreptitiously main-
taining a substantial cash fund for political contributions in the 
United States.56 As a result of these payments, Phillips and several of 
its officers were indicted for tax fraud and for violating the federal 
election law. The SEC sued to enjoin future violations of the securi-
ated with a company or firm which received in excess of a specified percentage figure of its 
gross sales from transactions with Northrop. 
See Undertaking Incorporated into Final Judgment schedule A (Resolutions of the Board 
of Directors Re Amendment of Articles and Re Amendment of By-Laws), Springer v. Jones, 
Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 1975). Cf. Proposed Amendments to 
Article II of the By-Laws of Phillips Petroleum Co. attached as exhibit M to the Stipulation of 
Settlement, Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 18, 1976) 
(similar definition of outside director). 
53. Undertaking Incorporated into Final Judgment, Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-
1455-F (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 1975). 
54. Undertaking Incorporated into Final Judgment at 4 & schedule A (Resolutions of the 
Board of Directors Re Amendment of Articles and Re Amendment of By-Laws), Springer v. 
Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 1975). Cf. Proposed Amendments 
to Article IV of the By-Laws of Phillips Petroleum Co. attached as Exhibit M to the Stipula-
tion of Settlement, Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 22, 
1976) (Undertaking approved by the court requires the board of directors to elect three new 
independent outside directors). 
55. Undertaking Incorporated into Final Judgment & schedule A (Resolutions of the 
Board of Directors Re Amendment of Articles), Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F 
(C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 1975). 
56. Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Co. Concerning Hearing on Confirma-
tion of Settlement at 3, Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 
22, 1976). 
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ties laws,57 and a shareholders' suit was brought to obtain injunctive 
relief against the company and the officers responsible for the pay-
ments. 58 
The settlement of the shareholders' suit required the company to 
institute several reforms designed to strengthen the independence of 
the board. As was the case with Northrop, the order directed the 
company to create a nominating and an audit committee and to 
amend its bylaws to increase the number and proportion of outside 
directors. 59 
B. The Implementation and Impact of Reform 
For those who hoped that judicially mandated institutional re-
form would significantly change corporate governance, the results of 
these settlements have been disappointing. New directors have been 
drawn from the same elite60 as old directors; new boards have not 
been notably more aggressive than unreformed boards. Moreover, 
board committees have not given boards much more insight into or 
control over management activities. This section examines how the 
three corporations carried out the settlement provisions pertaining to 
the selection of new directors. Section C broadly questions the effi-
cacy of independent directors and audit committees. 
The private settlements at Northrop and Phillips gave the plain-
tiffs a voice in the selection of new directors. The Northrop plain-
tiffs suggested ten candidates who, the plaintiffs believed, would be 
aggressively independent and acceptable to Northrop.61 The under-
taking required the company to interview and consider these candi-
dates as it did other candidates.62 The selection of candidates was 
entrusted to Northrop's nominating committee, subject to the court's 
supervmon. This committee, which was composed of the six 
outside directors then on Northrop's board, considered candidates of 
its own choice as well as plaintiffs' and announced its intention to 
nominate the candidates most likely to perform significant directo-
51. See Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Co. Concerning Hearing on Confir-
mation of Settlement at 3-5, Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal., filed 
Feb. 24, 1976); Phillips Petroleum Co., Annual Report 30 (1976). The defendants pied guilty 
to the charge .of violating the election laws. 
58. Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 22, 1976). 
59. See Final Judgment at 7-8, 18-25, Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. 
Cal., filed April 22, 1976). 
60. See note 13 supra. 
61. Interview with John R. Phillips, attorney, Center for Law in the Public Interest (Nov. 
11, 1977). 
62. Undertaking Incorporated into Final Judgment at 3-4, Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action 
No. 74-1455-F (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 20, 1975). 
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rial services and best able to fulfill the special responsibilities of the 
new directors.63 
The selection was a process of "horse trading" in which each side 
possessed a veto power.64 According to one of the plaintiffs' lawyers, 
Northrop understood (without ever having been explicitly told) that 
if the corporation rejected plaintiffs' nominees out of hand, the 
plaintiffs would vigorously attack the nominees in open court.65 Al-
though each side placed two candidates on the final slate of four, it is 
questionable whether this process produced different directors than 
the corporation would have chosen on its own.66 Both of the plain-
tiffs' nominees were members of the corporate club. One, William 
Balhaus, was in fact a former executive and director of Northrop, 
although since he had been a rival of Jones he might have been ex-
pected to keep a close eye on Northrop's management. Nevertheless, 
Northrop regarded Balhaus, the president of Beckman Industries, 
Inc., who had a board of directors of his own to deal with, to be 
"safe."67 One of Northrop's lawyers was able to say that "the plain-
tiff nominated [selected] many of the same people as the corporation 
would have."68 
The Phillips Petroleum settlement provided no formal mecha-
nism for the selection of directors; management and the plaintiffs 
openly bargained. Each side prepared a list of twenty candidates 
for the six new outside directorships. The plaintiffs' attorney, three 
outside directors of Phillips, the chairman, another high executive, 
and general counsel discussed the various candidates. 69 These appar-
63. Memorandum of Northrop Corp. Re Nomination of New Directors at 4-6, Springer v. 
Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 1975). 
64. Interview with Michael Klein, partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Wilmer, 
Cutler & Pickering (Aug. 30, 1977); Interview with John R. Phillips, supra note 61. 
65. Interview with John R. Phillips, supra note 61. 
66. Of the four nominees, two were corporate executives, one was a banker, and one had 
served as president of two large universities and as chairman of the board of a federal reserve 
bank. Memorandum of Northrop Corp. Re Nomination of New Directors at 8-10, Springer v. 
Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1445-F (C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 1975). 
It can be argued that different plaintiffs might have secured directors cast from a less con-
ventional mold. These plaintiffs may have been influenced by the nominating committee's 
criteria: (I) experience in industrial management; (2) familiarity with the operations of large 
corporations or ability to deal with complex financial matters; and (3) sophistication and ex-
pertise in the federal government's decision-making processes. Memorandum of Northrop 
Corp. Re Nomination of New Directors at 4-6, Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F 
(C.D. Cal., filed Feb. 3, 1975). 
67. Id. at 8; Interview with Michael Klein, supra note 64. Evidently Northrop assumed 
that Balhaus would hesitate to establish, as a member of the Northrop board, any precedent 
upsetting the traditional management-board relationship. 
68. Interview with Michael Klein, supra note 64. 
69. Interview with John R. Phillips, supra note 61. 
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ently "amicable negotiations" produced three new directors from the 
plaintiffs' list, and three from management's list.7° 
Unlike private plaintiffs, the SEC prefers not to intrude in the 
selection of directors,71 and it did not do so in the Mattel proceed-
ings. SEC enforcement orders usually allow management to draw up 
a list of candidates and give the Commission a right to review the list 
before it is presented for judicial approval or put before the share-
holders.72 Thus, the Commission's settlement with Mattel called for 
the company to select, subject to the Commission's approval, candi-
dates for new outside directors. Occasionally, the Commission dis-
cusses the candidates with a company or suggests possible candidates 
if a company has difficulty producing names. 
C. What Reform Has Wrought 
I. The Composition of Boards 
As the foregoing description of the selection procedures in three 
recent cases in which the board was a major subject in the remedial 
order suggests, reform-minded settlements have not transfigured the 
corporate board of directors. In each case, the traditional concept of 
the board was unaffected, and directors were drawn from the elites 
that have traditionally stocked corporate boards.73 
70. Stipulation of Settlement, Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. Action No. 75-611-EAC (C.D. Cal., 
filed Feb. 18, 1976); Weinstein, Phillips Petroleum Agrees To Change in Reply lo Suit, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 19, 1976, at 1, col. l; Bus. WEEK, March 1, 1976, at 19. 
71. Interview with Edward D. Herlihy, supra note 44; Interview with Theodore A. Levine, 
supra note 44. Helpful background was also provided by responses of new independent direc-
tors to a questionnaire. Bui cf. Loo & Ratner, supra note 44, at 148-49. Loo and Ratner 
describe the usual process as follows: the SEC and the corporation each propose candidates 
(the SEC selections coming from resumes on file with the Commission, volunteers, or individ-
uals with outstanding achievements in a particular field) and then negotiate, often supervised 
by a federal district court judge. The SEC's rigor and effectiveness are uncertain, however. 
The SEC seemingly approved Lockheed's original special review committee, which included 
two "implicated" outside directors, Jack K. Horton and Dwight M. Cochran, who as members 
of the Lockheed audit committee received information in 1972 about payoffs to Japanese gov-
ernment officials which, because of pressure from Lockheed's president and chairman, they 
did not report until 1974. Interview with John R. Phillips, supra note 61. See also Bus. 
WEEK, April 26, 1976, at 39. 
72. The Commission ascertains whether the nominees meet the nonaffiliation requirement 
and whether any of them have ever violated the securities laws. 
73. The experience of these three corporations is not atypical, as a review of reconstituted 
boards of four other corporations that were subject to remedial orders suggests. Of the thirty 
new outside directors appointed at the seven corporations, twenty-one were business execu-
tives, four were professionals, and five were from academic institutions. Only one of the new 
directors was a woman. The four additional companies are American Agronomics Corp., 
Bio-Medicial Sciences, Inc., Coastal States Gas Corp., and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Back-
ground information on the directors was drawn from various proxy statements, reports, and 
miscellaneous statements issued by the companies from 1973 through 1977. 
SEC and private settlements produce individuals of substantially the same background. 
March 1978) Corporate Board of .Directors 599 
This continuity in the board's ethos is perhaps symbolized by the 
retention of the chief executive officers by all of the reconstructed 
boards. The boards at Phillips Petroleum and Mattel were perhaps 
justified in retaining their chief executives since the allegations of 
wrongdoing against the executives were never substantiated, much 
less confirmed in court. W. F. Martin, chairman of the board and 
chief executive officer of Phillips Petroleum, was indicted along with 
the corporation by a federal grand jury for tax fraud.74 Martin 
pleaded not guilty; the charges _were eventually dropped as a viola-
tion of an earlier plea bargaining agreement. At Mattel, the new 
board declined to relieve Arthur Spear of his duties as chief execu-
tive officer though he had been a high-ranking executive during the 
time the alleged fraud occurred.75 . 
The boards at Phillips and Mattel could have concluded that 
Martin and Spear either knew or should have known of the wrong-
doing. flad the boards done so, they might have considered more 
carefully the chief executive's ethical standards. Yet, dismissal 
would have been drastic in the absence of proved malfeasance, and 
each man had served his company's and his shareholders' business 
interests well. 
Doubts about his guilt played no part, however, in the retention 
of Thomas Jones as chairman and chief executive of Northrop.76 In 
its report on Northrop's improper business practices, the special ex-
ecutive committee squarely blamed Jones for many of the corpora-
tion's derelictions. The committee found that Jones had promoted 
improper transactions and had fostered an irresponsible attitude 
among many of Northrop's executives.77 The committee recom-
Though the samples are too small to provide meaningful statistics, in both circumstances 70% 
of the new directors were business executives. 
74. See Phillips Petroleum Co., Form 8-K, Sept. 1976, Item 3. The indictment charged 
that the defendants had violated I.R.C. § 7206(1) by conspiring to make false accounting en-
tries on the company's books for the purpose of creating and concealing a fund for illegal 
political contributions. Martin was also indicted under I.R.C. § 7206(2) for aiding in the 
company's preparation and submission of inaccurate tax returns. 
75. Spear had been executive vice-president of operations from 1967-1972. The report of 
the special counsel appointed under the settlement order exonerated Spear of all wrongdoing. 
Mattel, Inc., Reports of Special Counsel and Special Auditor 38 (1975). The husband and 
wife who had led Mattel at the time of the securities violations, Eliot and Ruth Handler, re-
signed their positions as directors and officers shortly after the entry of the SEC's consent 
decree. Mattel Inc., Annual Report (1975). 
76. Following release of the special report by Northrop's executive committee concerning 
Northrop's irregular payments and transactions, Jones resigned as chairman. About six 
months later the board reinstated him. Northrop Corp., Proxy Statement, Annual Meeting of 
Stockholders To Be Held May 11, 1976, at 9-10. 
77. Report to the Board of Directors of Northrop Corp. on the Special Investigation of the 
Executive Committee 57-58 (1975). 
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mended that the board replace Jones as chairman, but, since there 
was no suitable replacement,78 that it retain him as president and 
chief executive officer. The board followed the committee's recom-
mendation to leave Jones in his managerial capacities but rejected 
the recommendation to remove him from the board. The board ex-
plained that it had forgiven Jones because his contribution to the 
reform of the affairs of the company had demonstrated that his pres-
ence on the board best served the interests of security holders.79 In 
reality, Jones remained in power because he had done "a good 
job":80 with his contacts abroad and his phenomenal profit record, 
Jones was simply too valuable to let go. 
In light of the circumstances, the continuity in management at 
the three corporations is not surprising or, except perhaps in North-
rop's case, disturbing. The boards were in a difficult, if not impossi-
ble, position. Had they vindicated their sense of morality by firing 
the top officers, they would probably have harmed the corporation 
and innocent members of the corporate constituency, such as share-
holders and employees. The difficulty of their position suggests that 
we are dealing with problems which will not be resolved by tinkering 
with the board of directors. The decision to retain the three chief 
executive officers illustrates the difficulties involved in controlling 
and managing large organizations, difficulties a reformed board is 
not specially suited to resolve. Problems such as the complexity of 
the moral issues, the diffuseness of responsibility in the corporation, 
the tyranny of the "indispensable" person, and the uncertainty as to 
how to represent the interests of groups which are affected by the 
corporation but which neither own nor manage it, remain perplexing 
and intractable. The difference between what the restructured 
boards did and what hypothetical "insider'' boards would have done 
in similar circumstances is probably imperceptible. As Richard W. 
Millar, a long-time director of Northrop, remarked at the time of the 
settlement of the Northrop litigation, "[The settlement is] not going 
to change anything."81 
These cases suggest the important question whether it is possible 
to devise a selection process which reliably recruits board members 
who would fit the requirements of the new board. A number of 
alternatives to traditional modes of selecting directors have been re-
cently proposed, but as yet courts have not seriously contemplated 
18. Id. at 58. 
79. Proxy Statement, supra note 76, at 11. 
80. Lindsey, The New Adventures of Tom Jones, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1976, § 3, at I, col. 3. 
81. Bus. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1975, at 60. 
March 1978) Corporate Board of .Directors 601 
them. Some of these proposals focus on the pool of potential direc-
tors and suggest more extensive use of professional directors or full-
time insider directors. 82 Others look to the duties of the directors and 
advocate redefining the director's constituency by requiring him to 
represent the "public" or a specific group. 83 · 
Behind these proposals lies the worthy hope that they will dimin-
ish management's domination of boards. Unfortunately, the success 
of these reforms is problematic and unlikely. 
To be sure, the appointment of "non-establishment" directors or 
of directors responsible for articulating the concerns of the public 
would broaden a corporation's perspective. Yet, directors unfamil-
iar with corporate finance or the company's business operations are 
ill-equipped to give constructive advice or to supervise management 
effectively. And a director who was distrusted or perceived as an 
obstructionist would only reduce the board's influence. Manage-
ment might withhold information from the board lest an independ-
ent director feed the information to a public agency or to hostile 
shareholders.84 The presence of directors dedicated to goals incom-
patible with, if not antithetical to, the traditional aim of profit max-
imization might fragment and polarize the board. If the board 
became highly political and resolved conflicts through shifting alli-
ances among representatives of divergent interests and values, timely 
and consistent decisions could become impossible. Management 
might then ignore the plenary board and, by dealing informally with 
the "reliable" directors, reduce board meetings to formality.85 If di-
rectors were chosen as representatives of constituencies, it would be 
necessary to decide which constituencies merit representation, to de-
82. See generally W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 52-55 (1940); P. DRUCKER, 
supra note 27, at 635-36; Barr, The Role of the Professional .Director, HARv. Bus. REv., May-
June 1976, at 18 (extra-time directors); Douglas, .Directors Who .Do Not .Direct, 47 HARV. L. 
REv. 1305 (1934); Drucker, supra note 3, at 24; Leech & Mundheim, supra note 29, at 1810-
11; Mace, The Changing Role of .Directors in the 1970s, 31 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1211 (1976). 
83. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 125; C. STONE, 
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 152-83 (1975). 
84. See Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed .Directors in a Private Corporation-the Com-
munications Satellite Act of 1962, 79 HARv. L. REv. 350, 359 (1965) (government-appointed 
public directors serving the board of Union Pacific in the nineteenth century claimed, "they 
were treated as spies and antagonists and kept in the dark about many things"). q. C. 
STONE, supra note 83, at 173 (suggests that if general public-directors are used, guidelines be 
established for secrecy and release of information). 
85. For example, Peruvian law mandated participation of workers in the ownership and 
management of industrial corporations. A general manager of a corporation reported that 
workers' representatives on a board disrupted meetings and that nonworker directors therefore 
met informally at the corporate president's house. See Kendell, Workers Share in Peru Indus-
try, N.Y. Times, April 22, 1973, at 16, coL I; Martin, Working Partner: Peruvian Regime Seeks 
Labor Harmony by Giving Employees Say in Management, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1975, at 42, coL 
I. 
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fine the constituency, and to develop adequate selection processes.86 
Some authors have suggested that representatives of the public be 
chosen by a governmental organ.87 But this might permit political 
patronage to dictate the selection and produce unqualified public di-
rectors.88 Moreover, to minimize the tension between these public 
directors on one hand and management and the remaining directors 
on the other, it might be necessary to allow the corporation to par-
ticipate in the selection of the public directors. 89 Yet that could viti-
ate the independence of these directors.90 In light of these 
considerations, and of the difficulties of assuring that public interest 
directors remain faithful to their constituents, it is not surprising that 
the limited experience with public directors in the United States is 
discouraging.91 
86. See Conard, Reflections on Public Interest .Directors, 15 MICH. L. REv. 941, 955-57 
(1977). 
F;/. C. STONE, supra note 83, at 159; Moscow, The Independent .Director, 28 Bus. LAW. 9, 
12 (1972). 
88. See, e.g., INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY REsEARCH CENTER, INC., supra note 16, at 32-34 
(1974) (government appointments to the board of directors of General Anilene & Film Corp., 
when the federal government controlled the corporation, were used as instruments of political 
patronage). See also Conard, supra note 86, at 956-67 (government-appointed directors 
might look more to their superiors in Washington than to their constituents). 
Of course, legislation relieving public interest directors of liability for breach of certain 
traditional directorial responsibility to shareholders, see id. at 947-49, and defining their duties 
to the public would be needed. 
The statute creating the Communications Satellite Corp. and permitting the President to 
appoint, subject to Senate confirmation, 3 out of IS board members does not indicate whether 
the public directors have any special duties, functions, or responsibilities. 47 U.S.C. § 7331 
(1970). The Prudential Insurance Co. of America has six public directors who are appointed 
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. N.J. REv. STAT. § 17B:18-20 
(1977). The powers and duties of the public and nonpublic (elected) directors are the same, 
except that the public directors may petition the Commissioner of Insurance demanding that 
an opposition slate of director candidates be nominated if they are not satisfied with the rec• 
ommendations of the board. N.J. REv. STAT.§ 17B:18-24 (1977). Stone recommends a nine-
point definition of public directors' functions and powers. C. STONE, supra note 83, at 160-73, 
180-83. 
89. Christopher Stone, for example, advocates that public directors selected by a proposed 
Federal Corporations Commission or, in its absence, the SEC, would be seated only upon 
approval by a majority of the board and could be removed by the corporation without cause 
(by a unanimous vote) or for cause (by two-thirds vote). C. STONE, supra note 83, at 159. 
90. See, e.g., [Report of] CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS, 115 u. PA. L. REV. 662, 739 
(1967) (statement of Abraham L. Pomerantz): "[I]fyou (corporate management] are choosing 
. . . an independent director you are not going to choose anybody who is going to be too hard 
on you." 
91. As Dean Blumberg concluded, "we have some limited American experience in the 
case of the Union Pacific Railroad, the Illinois Central Railroad and the Prudential Life Insur-
ance Company. I might add that none of these institutions have [sic] shown any change what-
soever as a result of this unusual feature of its board." Blumberg, The Role of the Corporation 
in Society Today, 31 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1406 (1976). See generally Townsend, Let's Install Public 
.Directors, Bus. & SoCY. REv., Spring 1972, at 69; Arthur Goldberg on Public .Directors, Bus. & 
Socy. REv., Spring 1973, at 69; Blumberg, 'Who Belongs on Corporate Boards?, Bus. & SoCY. 
REv., Spring 1973, at 35; Responses to the Goldberg Proposal on Public .Directors, Bus. & SoCY. 
REv., Summer 1973, at 37. 
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In sum, if these drawbacks to the external selection of directors 
could be eliminated, selection by this mode :Qlight be preferable, es-
pecially if it is deemed desirable for the board to become a political 
organ and to represent society's broader interests. But, ifwe settle for 
the board which only attempts to monitor management, selection of 
directors by the corporation may be more appropriate. 
Beyond the formal requisite of independence, a director should 
possess three paramount attributes. First, a director must be famil-
iar with the management of complex organizations, knowledgeable 
about corporate business and finances and sensitive to the concerns 
of social policy.92 Second, a director must be able to raise unpleasant 
questions without losing the respect of other board members and 
management. Third, a director must be willing to spend the time 
needed to do the job properly.93 
But are there enough qualified and willing candidates? Academ-
ics are generally not experienced in corporate affairs and, as outsid-
ers to the corporation, might be thought untrustworthy or lacking in 
judgment. Executives and professionals, who are most likely to be 
experienced, are unlikely to be independent of the corporate ethos. 
Active academics, executives, and professionals are all likely to be 
too busy to pass the third test. Retired or semi-retired executives or 
professionals may be just as, if not more, imbued with the corporate 
outlook as their active counterparts. 
The difficulties of securing competent yet independent directors 
might be overcome by using professional directors or full-time inside 
directors. A professional director would be experienced in business, 
would serve full-time as a director of one or more corporations and 
would be well paid and reasonably protected from dismissal during 
a term of office. To prevent a dependency on or co-optation by 
management, or too great an identification with a corporation, it 
might be desirable to bar professional directors from serving consec-
utive terms in the same corporation. However, proponents of the 
idea have not specified how such directors should be selected or 
which corporations should be required to use them. It is not clear 
that there would be enough qualified applicants for positions as pro-
fessional directors. Finally, professional directors might take their 
commissions too zealously and meddle in the daily operations of the 
92. See, e.g., Lewis, Choosing and Using Outside .Directors, HAR.v. Bus. R.Ev., July-Aug. 
1974, at 70, 73 ( directors should have analytical intelligence, an awareness of social and politi-
cal and economic environment, and a capacity to evaluate a corporation's strategy). See also 
J. LoUDEN, supra note 10, at 37. 
93. See text i'!fra at note 94. 
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company or incessantly call upon management to account for itself. 
Corporate executives apparently fear these possibilities and have 
evinced little relish for professional directors. 
Nor do corporate executives advocate the use of full-time inside 
directors. Such a director might be a retired officer or an active 
senior officer of the corporation temporarily relieved of most of his 
managerial responsibilities. Texas Instruments allows officers who 
have taken early retirement and senior executives to serve as "gen-
eral directors." Such directorial duties take at least thirty days a 
year.94 General directors also assume a major responsibility outside 
the corporation, such as service as a director of another corporation, 
consultation, participation in civic organizations, or part-time gov-
ernment service, with the hope that such experience will broaden the 
directors' perspective on the corporation's affairs. But an individual 
performing directorial duties thirty days a year is hardly a full-time 
director. Few corporations, further, can afford highly paid execu-
tives who perform no managerial functions. More fundamentally, 
the outlook of the inside director is cabined, cribbed, and confmed 
by his long experience in and allegiance to the corporation. One 
doubts the full-time insider director would be any more "indepen-
dent" than the traditional part-time insider director. 
2. Board Committees 
Reformers, we have seen,95 hope that a board committee charged 
with a specific responsibility such as nominating new directors or 
reviewing the company's fmances can develop greater expertise and 
authority than the board acting as a whole. Since settlements of 
94. Administrative Committee of the Board, Texas Instruments Inc., Organization of the 
Board of Directors and Retirement Practices of Directors and Top Officers, Texas Instruments 
Inc. at 3, 6 (1974). See generally Remarks by Bryan F. Smith, then General Director, Texas 
Instruments Inc., to a conference, The Responsible Corporate Board and the Effective Direc-
tor (sponsored by Graduate School of Business, Columbia University) (April 25, 1977); Re-
marks by Bryan F. Smith, General Director, Texas Instruments Inc., to a conference, Chief 
Executives Update (sponsored by School of Business Administration, Southern Methodist 
University) (Oct. 2, 1975); Board of Directors, Texas Instruments Inc., Statement of Pol-
icy-Subject: Composition of the Board and Responsibilities and Estimated Time Require-
ments of Board Members, reprinted in Administrative Committee of the Board, supra at 16 
app. See also J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 2, at 37-39; Mace, Designing a Plan far the 
Ideal Board, HAR.v. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 20, 36 (1976). Active executives appointed 
to a general directorship are relieved of most or all managerial responsibilities. To encourage 
general directors to be conscientious, the corporation pays them $30,000 annually plus a per 
diem fee. Addendum, Organization of the Board of Directors and Retirement Practices of 
Directors and Top Officers, Texas Instruments Inc., Exhibit 40 (Guidance Memorandum for 
Determining the Fees of Directors) (Sept. 1975). 
95. See text at notes 22-27. 
March 1978) Corporate Board oj JJirectors 605 
litigation arising out of managerial misbehavior often establish 
board committees, we can tentatively appraise their value. 
a. Nominating Committees. A principal cause of directorial 
diffidence is that the chief executive officer, who traditionally selects 
the candidates for board membership, can intimidate would-be dis-
senters who wish to remain on the board and who know he can deny 
them reappointment.96 Reformers have promoted the formation of 
nominating committees composed primarily or entirely of outside di-
rectors, to screen candidates and recommend nominees to the full 
board.97 
Nominating committees were established as part of the remedial 
changes made at Northrop and Mattel.98 Northrop's settlement fol-
lowed the general practice of giving a majority of seats on nominat-
ing committees to outside directors, and the Northrop committee 
consisted of three new outside directors and one old one;99 the Mat-
tel committee consisted of four new independent directors and one 
inside director.100 One cannot say whether the directors these com-
mittees nominated were any more independent than traditionally se-
lected directors. Certainly the choices appear to represent no new 
departure. The Northrop committee nominated a former senior 
vice-president of the company,101 and the Mattel committee picked 
three outside corporate executives and an executive vice-president of 
Mattel.102 Given the troubles of Northrop and Mattel, the pool of 
potential nominees was probably small. 
Possibly a nominating committee cannot significantly insulate 
the board from management. Because management is responsible 
for daily operations of a business, the nominating committee invaria-
96. EISENBERG, supra 16, at 175-76; NINE COUNTRIES, supra note 33, at 88; Leech & 
Mundheim, supra note 29, at 1830. 
97. A nominating committee may also propose committee memberships and successors to 
the chief executive officer. 
98. Undertaking Incorporated Into Final Judgment schedule A (Resolutions of the Board 
of Directors Re Amendment of By-Laws), Springer v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 74-1455-F (C.D. 
Cal., filed Jan. 20, 1975). 
99. See Northrop Corp., Proxy Statement, Annual Meeting of Shareholders To Be Held 
May IO, 1977, at 3. 
100. Mattel, Inc., Annual Report to Shareholders for the Year Ending Jan. 29, 1977, at 5. 
See also I Report of the Special Committee to the Board of Directors of Ashland Oil, Inc. 20 I 
(June 26, 1975) (recommending that the nominating committee consist of the corporation's 
chief executive officer and two outside directors appointed by the board as a whole); Report of 
the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors, Lockheed Aircraft Corp. 24 (May 16, 
1977) (proposing that the nominating committee consist solely of outside directors). 
IOI. Northrop Corp., Proxy Statement, Annual Meeting of Shareholders To Be Held May 
10, 1977, at 2-3. 
102. Mattel, Inc., Proxy Statement, Notice of the Annual Meeting of Stockholders To Be 
Held June 9, 1977, at 4-5. One of the outside directors was a woman. 
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bly consults it regarding nominees, 103 and because the board must 
have rapport with management, a nominating committee, even one 
composed entirely of outsiders, generally accedes to management's 
wishes. Only a rare committee would recommend a person manage-
ment thought unacceptable.104 Nominating committees thus face 
what appears to be unresolvable tension between choosing inexperi-
enced outsiders, who are distrusted by management, or selecting in-
siders overly sympathetic to management, who are distrusted by the 
"public." 
b. Audit Committees. The board committee that has received 
the greatest attention as an instrument for improving board oversight 
of management is the audit committee. Audit committees, which 
monitor and investigate a company's financial transactions, are 
designed to prevent financial improprieties. Audit committees are 
increasingly popular among large corporations105 and have stimu-
lated extensive writing.106 
The audit committee has been a flexible institution. It is gener-
ally composed of four or five members, most of whom are outside 
directors. It is a direct line between the independent accounting 
firm and the directors, and it can perform a wide range of tasks 
under the rubric of its general responsibility for coordinating and 
evaluating internal and external audits. Audit committees recom-
mend an auditing firm to the full board;107 confer with the auditors 
103. Thus, the Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors, Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp. 24 (May 16, 1977), proposed that the nominating co=ittee, which con-
sisted solely of outside directors, make recommendations to the full board "[a]fter a full review 
of each possible nominee's qualifications and in consultation with the Company's chief execu-
tive." 
104. Some investment companies have voluntarily begun to use independent directors, 
who make up 40% of the board (IS U.S.C. § 80a-I0(a) (1976)), to select outside directors. 
Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 205, 234-35 (1970). Most 
nominating committees of investment companies continue to rely on management (the advisor 
to the investment company) or its representatives to suggest nominees. Nutt, A Study of Mu-
tual Fund .Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 216 (1971). 
105. See text at notes 34-36 supra. 
106. See, e.g., Arthur Anderson & Co., The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors 
(1972); The Coopers & Lybrand Audit Committee Guide (1972) [hereinafter cited as Coopers 
& Lybrand]; Haskins & Sells, Audit Committees (1977); Hurdman & Cranstoun, Audit Com-
mittees as a Constructive Force (1974); Laventhol & Horwath, Audit Committees (n.d.); R. 
MAUTZ & F. NEUMANN, supra note 38; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., The Audit Committee 
(1977); Price Waterhouse & Co., The Audit Committee (1976); Touche Ross, Corporate Audit 
Committees (1970); Colegrove, The Functions and Responsibilities of the Corporate Audit Com• 
mi/lee, 19 CAL. MANAGEMENT REv. 41 (1976); Farrell, The Audit Commillee-A Lawyer's 
View, 28 Bus. LAW. 1089 (1973); Lovdal, Making the Audit Commillee Work, HARV. Bus. 
REv., March-April 1977, at 108. 
I 07. In 60% of the corporations responding to the Coopers & Lybrand survey, the audit 
committee appointed or nominated the outside auditors. Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 106, 
at 13 (figure 3). 
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before, during, and after the audit about its scope, procedures, 
problems, and results; 108 and discuss with the corporation's internal 
auditors the nature and effectiveness of their work. In addition, au-
diting committees have frequently investigated suspect payments 
and other financial irregularities.109 
Ideally, the audit committee helps outside directors, manage-
ment, and the auditors. Through its independent access to financial 
information and its contact with the independent auditors, the audit 
committee can better inform the board of the company's financial 
activities and improve the board's supervision of management. The 
committee offers management an opportunity to review the com-
pany's financial reporting and controls. The audit committee gives 
internal auditors direct access to the board of directors. It shields 
the external auditors from undue management influence110 by pro-
viding a forum in which they can confer directly with board mem-
108. According to the Coopers & Lybrand survey, supra note 106, only 43% of the com-
mittees met with the independent auditor to discuss the scope of the engagement before the 
audit, and 40% met with the independent auditor to review the financial statements before 
publication. In contrast, a New York Stock Exchange survey of listed corporations with audit 
committees found that in 97% of the corporations the audit committee periodically met with 
the independent auditor before and after the audit, and that in 75% of the corporations the 
audit committee periodically met with the independent auditors to review the company's con-
trol procedures. The New York Stock Exchange, Response to the White Paper Questionnaire 
Concerning Recommendations and Comments on Financial Reporting to Shareholders and 
Related Matters 3 (n.d.). 
109. Courts have required audit committees to conduct investigations when improper con-
duct was suspected or discovered. See, e.g., SEC v. J. Ray McDermott, [1976-1977 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,738 (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1976); SEC v. Foremost-McKesson, 
Inc., Civ. Action No. 76-1257 (D.D.C., filed July 7, 1976); SEC v. The Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., Civ. Action No. 76-1064 (D.D.C., filed June 1, 1976); SEC v. Lum's Inc., [1973-1974 
Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 94,504 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 1974). The special 
counsel and special auditor undertook the investigations in SEC v. Mattel, Inc., Civ. Action 
74-2958-FW (C.D. Cal, filed Nov. 26, 1974). 
Special review committees, composed of independent directors and charged with con-
ducting an investigation ( often with the aid of independent legal counsel) were established, for 
example, in the following settlements: SEC v. General Tire & Rubber Co .• No. 76-0799 
(D.D.C., filed May 10, 1976); SEC v. Lockheed, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 95,509 (D.D.C. 1976); SEC v. United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] 
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,402 (D.D.C. 1976); SEC v. Ashland Oil, No. 75-0794 (D.D.C., 
filed May 15, 1975); SEC v. American Ship Bldg., (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 1974), discussed in SEC 
Litigation Release No. 6534 (Oct. 4, 1974). 
The settlement in Springer v. Jones required Northrop's Executive Committee to inquire 
into the corporation's relationships or arrangements with consultants, independent representa-
tives and commission agents previously identified in an auditor's report and other matters 
necessary to complete the investigation. Springer v. Jones, Undertaking, Civ. Action No. 74-
1455-F (C.D. Cal, filed Jan 20, 1975). The investigation of conflicts of interest by disinter-
ested directors has also been mandated. See, e.g., Lasher v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
110. Over 68% percent of the independent CPAs surveyed by Mautz and Neumann be-
lieved that audit committees enhanced their independence; a number also indicated that with 
an audit committee, independent CPAs could more easily fulfill their role. R. MAUTZ & F. 
NEUMANN, supra note 38, at 48, 115. 
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bers about their accounting practices, about the quality of internal 
accountability, or about suspicious financial transactions. Of 
course, the committee can best protect the auditors if the outside ac-
countants cannot be replaced except upon the recommendation of 
the committee. 
Audit committees could disrupt corporate leadership. Manage-
ment might resent a committee which appears to intrude upon man-
agement's activities or its relations with its internal auditors. 111 Yet, 
according to one survey of executives, directors, and accountants, 
conflicts are infrequent and are not thought to imperil the company's 
welfare. 112 In practice management and committees have respected 
each other's jurisdiction,113 and reasonably precise guidelines can 
probably be devised to forestall conflict. 
We do not yet know how well audit committees work in practice. 
According to one survey, chief executive officers and internal audi-
tors generally approve of audit committees.114 Significantly, outside 
auditors are less pleased; more than one third of the independent 
accountants who responded said that the audit committees ineff ec-
tively review fmancial information provided to government agen-
cies, the shareholders, and the public.115 
Audit committees have on several notable occasions exposed an 
executive's malefactions. For example, the audit committee created 
by the SEC's consent decree with Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. re-
portecl that a former vice-chairman and chief financial officer of the 
corporation controlled but could not account for an approximately 
one million dollar company fund for illegal domestic political contri-
butions.116 At Gulf Oil a special "ad hoc" audit committee of two 
outside directors and a nondirector attorney chronicled fourteen 
years of clandestine and illegal expenditures in the United States and 
abroad. Partly as a result of this report, the board of directors 
ousted the chairman and three senior executives. 117 Similar commit-
tees at General Tire and Rubber Co. and American Ship Building 
Co. investigated and reported on corporate subsidies of campaign 
111. Id. at 41; Coopers & Lybrand, supra note 106, at 27 (1976). 
112. R. MAUTZ & F. NEUMANN, supra note 38, at 39-42. 
113. Id. at 114. 
114. Id. at 59. 
115. Id. at 61. 
116. Wall St J., Oct 26, 1977, at 8, col. 3. 
117. For an analysis of the ouster, see Calame, Morality Play, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1976, at 
1, col. 6. See generally Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors of 
Gulf Oil Corp. (Dec. 30, 1975). 
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{J contributions by top executives.us Yet, audit committees have not 
always done well. Audit committees at Gulf Oil and Lockheed 
failed to discover illegal uses of corporate funds. 119 At Lockheed, 
members of the audit committee inquired about commissions paid to 
foreign agents but evidently were satisfied with management's assur-
ance that the payments were legal.120 
The failures at Gulf and Lockheed may be attributable to the fact 
that the outside directors were personal friends of top manage-
ment.121 Nevertheless, management can probably hide fraud from 
an audit committee if it wants to.122 Not only has the sophistication 
of misfeasance reached new heights, but it is difficult for audit com-
mittee members to remain alert to the rare but flagrant situations in 
which they are needed. At best, an active, independent audit com-
mittee composed of seasoned, knowledgeable business executives 
may lessen opportunities for improprieties. The mere presence of 
an audit committee may deter questionable activities by manage-
ment. But if so, the efficacy of the deterrence may be difficult, if not · 
impossible, to measure. 
118. American Ship Building Co., Report of the Special Review Committee 41-48 (May l, 
1975); Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion of the Special Review of the Board of 
Directors of the General Tire and Rubber Co. 2-3, 9 (July 19, 1977). On the urging of the 
General Tire committee, two officers reimbursed the company for the payments. N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 28, 1977, § 4, at 3, col. 6. 
119. Report of The Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors of Gulf Oil 
Corp. 70-82, 107-11, 116-22, 127-38, 140, 144-46, 149-60, 182-85 (Dec. 30, 1975); Report of the 
Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors Lockheed Aircraft Corp. 21-22 (May 16, 
1977). For further discussion of the scandal at Gulf, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1976, § 3, at 1, col. 
3; Jensen, Gulf Oil and Its Millions far Politicians, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1975, at l, col. l. 
Directors on Gulfs board also claimed that they had been kept in the dark about the full 
extent of the slush-fund scandal. See Calame, Morality Play, Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1976, at 1, 
col. 6; Calame, Cleaning Up the Slush, Wall St. J., Jan. 13, 1976, at 34, col. l; Calame, Gu!f's 
Outside .Directors Left Uninformed into '75 on Extent of Gifts, .Director Says, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 
1975, at 34, col. 2. 
120. Report of the Special Review Committee of the Board of Directors Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. 21-28 (May 16, 1977). For background information, see Sansweet, Crisis at Lock-
heed, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 6; A. SAMPSON, supra note 50. 
121. As to Gulfs outside directors, see Robertson, supra note 11, at 122. Daniel J. 
Haughton, Lockheed's chairman of the board and A. Carl Kotchiam, vice-chairman of the 
board and chief operating officer, apparently "leaned on" at least two outside members, 
Dwight M. Cochran and Jack K. Horton, of the Lockheed audit committee. Telephone con-
versation with John R. Phillips, Nov. 11, 1977. 
122. The Conference Board reached this conclusion, J. BACON & J. BROWN, supra note 2, 
at 118, as did J. Wilson Newman, who chaired Lockheed's special review committee: "[I]f 
management really wants to sway foreign customers through bribes, it can probably keep the 
board in the dark." Bus. WEEK, Oct. 10, 1977, at 74, 77. Dr. John Rettaliate, president, 
Illinois Institute of Technology and a member of corporate boards, noted, ''You really don't 
know what's going on. If management really wants to put something over on a director, it 
can." Vanderwicken, supra note 19, at 158. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The traditional corporate board of directors is part of manage-
ment's team. The chief executive establishes corporate goals and 
strategy and the board accepts his proposals, adding, perhaps, some 
friendly advice. Reformers envisage a board prepared to oppose 
management. Board members are independently to evaluate man-
agement and corporate performance and to propose corporate goals 
and strategy or, at least, to criticize those of management. 
This Article has ex~mined two means of increasing the indepen-
dence of corporate boards-allocating more board seats to outside 
directors and creating more board committees. Certainly, institu-
tional reform in these directions can improve corporate governance. 
But as long as directors are drawn largely from the ranks of past and 
present corporate executives and professionals, we are unlikely to 
witness major shifts in the character of the board.123 Committees are 
an uncertain check on management, and they may proliferate only to 
undertake trivial functions which occupy the time of outside direc-
tors and create only the illusion of board independence. 
Ultimately, the obstacle to effective control of management lies 
in the size and structure of the modem large corporation. Major 
corporate enterprises are sprawling institutions in which power is 
dispersed among a small army of technocrats. 124 Countering this de-
centralization is the hierarchy led by the chief executive officer. Even 
a reformed board of directors is ill-suited to exert a major influence. 
It is too remote from "local" decision makers, and it cannot match 
the chief executive's institutional authority and control over the ma-
chinery of corporate government. Corporate reformers are well-ad-
vised either to look to other means of regulating corporate conduct 
or to adopt a more radical approach to the problem of corporate 
govemance.125 
123. The author of one empirical study of the impact of outside directors disparages the 
idea that the presence of outsiders has any significance. Schmidt, IJoes Board Compos,~ion 
Really Make a Difference?, 12 CONF. Bo. REc. 38 (Oct. 1975). Schmidt states, 
[T]he whole idea of relating the behavior of corporations to the number of insiders or 
outsiders on the board is a sham. Perhaps other more important characteristics dominate, 
such as the merit of the individual director, the rapport oetween the board and operating 
executives, [and] the quality of information fed to board members. 
Id, at 41. See also Schmidt, Insiders v. Outsiders as IJireclors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 3, 
at 15, col 1. See generally s. VANCE, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: STRUCTURE AND PERFORM• 
ANCE (1964) (study of 103 large corporations concluded that, on the average, inside directors 
performed better than outside directors). 
124. See Solomon, Toward a Federal Policy on Work: Restructuring the Governance of 
Corpora/ions, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263 (1975). 
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